



THE FINANCES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Update 2009-2010

Library

The following is a brief update of the bibliography « The Finances of the European Union : April 2009 ». As in the previous editions, this bibliographic survey deliberately does not contain any standard press articles, nor official documents from the Institutions, which would alone have been sufficient subject matter for a large bibliography. Its aim is primarily to record the "academic" and "scientific literature", but it also does not neglect the more "partisan" publications, reflecting the positions of certain political circles or interest groups. The theme of the budget is, in fact, far from being a purely "academic" subject, and this bibliography also contains some more political contributions. A new updated edition of the bibliography will be published before the end of 2010.

THE FINANCES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION - GENERAL

BACHTLER John, MÉNDEZ Carlos, WISHLADE Fiona. « Ideas for budget and policy reform : reviewing the debate on Cohesion Policy 2014+ ». 47 p. (European Policy Research Paper ; 67). http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/documents/PDF_files/EPRP_67_Ideas_for_Budget_and_Policy_Reform.pdf

BECKER Peter, PRIMOVA Radostina. « Die Reform des EU-Budgets zwischen Modernisierung und Pfadabhängigkeit : aus Gutachten, Studien und Aufsätzen der Jahre 2006 bis 2008 ». Berlin : Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), 2009. 8 p. http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5776

BEGG Iain. « Fiscal federalism, subsidiarity and the EU budget review ». Stockholm : Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), 2009. 68 p. (Reports / Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) ; 2009:1). <http://www.sieps.se/en/publications/rapporteur/fiscal-federalism-subsidiarity-and-the-eu-budget-review-en.html>

COMMISSION EUROPÉENNE. « Les finances publiques de l'Union européenne ». 4. ed. Luxembourg : Publications Office, 2009. 455 p. http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/publications/financial_pub/EU_pub_fin_fr.pdf

COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS. « EU budget review : options for change ». Copenhagen : Copenhagen Economics, 2009. 105 p. General note: Study prepared for The Dutch Ministries of Finance, Economics Affairs and Agriculture. Contents note 1. Main findings of the overview study -- 2. A primer on principles for funding policy at the EU level -- 3. Structural funds -- 4. Natural Resource Management -- 5. Growth oriented policies -- 6. Internal and external security including development assistance -- 7. A small note on administrative expenditure. http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform/library/focus/study_options_for_change_June09.pdf

DÉVOLUY Michel. « Les voies de réforme du budget de l'UE ». *Bulletin de l'Observatoire des politiques économiques en Europe*, 2007, n. 17, p. 6-11. <http://www.apr-strasbourg.org/docs/20071204-fiches.pdf>

FIGUEIRA Filipa. « How to reform the EU budget? : a methodological toolkit ». Stockholm : Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), 2009. 75 p. (Reports / Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) ; 2009:5). <http://www.sieps.se/en/publications/rapporteur/how-to-reform-the-eu-budget-a-methodological-toolkit-20095.html>

GRZESZCZYK Tadeusz Adam. « Ocena projektów Europejskich 2007-2013 ». Warszawa : Wydawnictwo Placet, 2009. 344 p.

HEINEMANN Friedrich, MOHL Philipp, Osterloh, Steffen. « Reforming the EU budget : reconciling needs with political-economic constraints ». *European Integration*, 2010, v. 32, n. 1, p. 59-76

KAUPPI Heikki, WIDGRÉN Mika. « The excess power puzzle of the EU budget ». 29 p. (Aboa Centre for Economics / Discussion Paper ; 45). Summary: It is a constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU) spends the money it collects from its member states. This paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle involves one-shot games that have persistent impacts on the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the member states are able to establish rules or contracts that restrict the budget allocation in advance. In the current status quo, France and Spain are the clearest winners of these restrictions, while Austria, Finland and Sweden, not to mention the new member states, suffer largest losses. <http://www.ace-economics.fi/kuvat/dp45.pdf>

LAMASSOURE Alain. « Crise budgétaire : comment préserver l'avenir européen? ». Paris : Fondation Robert Schuman, 2010. 7 p. (Questions d'Europe ; n° 181). http://www.robert-schuman.eu/question_europe.php?num=qe-181

PARLIAMENT. HOUSE OF LORDS. « The EC Budget 2010 : report with evidence ». London : HMSO, 2009. 44 p. (House of Lords, European Union Committee ; 2008/2009. Report 20). <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldeucom/146/146.pdf>

SAARILAHTI Ilkka, GHIGNONE Piera. « Les innovations des procédures budgétaires communautaires : sixième partie : le budget général pour 2009 : une année de modification de l'accord interinstitutionnel du 17 mai 2006 ». *Revue du Marché commun*, 2009, n. 533, p. 670-691

SAARILAHTI Ilkka. « 40 vuotta Euroopan unionin budjetointia : yleisen talousarvion kehitys vuosina 1968-2008 = 40 years of EU budgeting : the development of the general budget from 1968 to 2008 = 40 ans de budgets communautaires : le développement du budget général de 1968 à 2008 ». Florence : European Press Academic Publishing, 2009. 159 p. In Finnish; with summaries in English and French.

SANTOS Indhira, NEHEIDER Susanne. « A better process for a better budget ». Brussels : Bruegel, 2009. 8 p. (Bruegel Policy Brief ; 4).

http://www.bruegel.org/uploads/tx_btbbreugel/pb_2009-04_final_310709.pdf

Summary: European Union budget negotiations often focus on member states' financial net balances, rather than on spending with EU-level added value. But net positions are an unreliable guide to sound EU policy. Changing the budget process is a precondition for any significant reform; the stubborn link between net balances and spending decisions will not be broken until the decision-making procedure changes. This will improve the quality of EU budget spending.

SANTOS Indhira, NEHEIDER Susanne. « Reframing the EU budget : decision-making process ». Brussels : Bruegel, 2009. 30 p. (Bruegel Working Paper ; 3). Content note: This paper traces the history of the EU budget and draws lessons for the review to come. Whatever reforms are proposed, the authors believe that they must serve to shift spending to policy areas and instruments where the EU can best add value while at the same time recognising the political need for member states to present EU budget negotiation results in net-balance terms. A two-stage negotiation is proposed: first member states should negotiate and agree on what constitute EU public goods. Everything else would thereafter - by default - be deemed redistributive/compensatory spending to be financed on the basis of member states current overall net balances. <http://www.bruegel.org/nc/publications/show/publication/reframing-the-eu-budget-decision-making-process.html>

SAUREL Stéphane. « Le budget de l'Union européenne ». Paris : Documentation française, 2010. 211 p. (Collection Réflexe Europe). Contents note : L'établissement, l'adoption et l'exécution du budget de l'Union européenne: Les grands principes du droit budgétaire de l'Union européenne -- La procédure d'adoption du budget de l'Union européenne -- Le cadre financier de l'Union européenne pour la période 2007-2013 -- L'exécution du budget -- Le développement des contrôles interne et externe du budget de l'Union européenne -- Les dépenses de l'Union européenne: Les politiques de compétitivité -- La politique de cohésion -- La politique agricole commune -- Liberté, sécurité et justice -- Citoyenneté -- L'Union

européenne, partenaire mondial -- Les dépenses administratives -- Les recettes de l'Union européenne: Le système des ressources propres -- L'évolution du système des ressources propres -- La question des soldes nets -- Les réflexions sur l'avenir du financement de l'Union européenne.

ZULEEG Fabian. « The rationale for EU action : what are European public goods? ». 19 p. General note: Prepared for the "BEPA Workshop on the political economy of EU public finances: designing governance for change". http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/docs/eu_public_goods_zuleeg.pdf

LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND STRUCTURE OF THE BUDGET

AKSOY Deniz. « Who gets what, when, and how revisited : Voting and proposal powers in the allocation of the EU budget ». *European Union Politics*, 2010, v. 11, n. 2, p. 171-194

ANDREASEN Martha. « Brussels laid bare ». Yelverton : St Edwards Press Ltd, 2009. 128 p. Varying title: "Brussels laid bare : how the EU treated its chief accountant when she refused to go along with its fraud and waste ». Formatted contents note: I. Recruitment -- II. My first month in office -- III. Expressing my views -- IV. The pressure to sign increases -- V. My responsibility as chief accountant is removed -- VI. Suspended for 18 months and my disciplinary procedure -- VII. Appealing to the European Court of First Instance -- Epilogue.

BIONDI Yuri, SOVERCHIA Michela. « Accounting rules for the European Communities : a theoretical analysis ». 34 p. Contents note: Paper prepared for the 6th EIASM international conference on "Accounting, Auditing and Management in Public Sector Reforms", Copenhagen, September 2010 and 32nd EGPA Annual Conference, PSG XIV on "EU Administration and Multi-Level Governance", Toulouse, September 2010. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1627666 Summary: A theoretical analysis is provided of the accounting framework and rules applied to the annual accounts of the European Communities (EC) since 2004. This accounting system draws upon International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and is based on accrual accounting, under a dual integrated accounting process with the cash accounting that is maintained. It purports to shape the financial accounting and reporting of the supranational entity that are the EC. This entity carries out a wide range of policies and programs through the financial resources provided by the European Union Member States, making it accountable for incurred expenditure to these constituents. By analyzing the accounting conceptual framework and the sixteen specific rules, the paper assesses the capacity of its accounting system to provide a true and fair representation of the economy of the EC entity featured by that expenditure-sharing purpose, under the overall no-profit motive that is typical of every public administration.

BOUDET Jean-François. « Les compétences budgétaires du Parlement européen relèvent-elles d'une démarche constitutionnelle? : éléments pour un débat européen ». *Les Petites affiches*, n. 116, 11 juin 2009, p. 65-73

BREHON Nicolas-Jean. « Le budget européen : quelle négociation pour le prochain cadre financier de l'Union européenne ? ». Paris : Fondation Robert Schuman, 2010. 30 p. (Questions d'Europe ; n° 170 et 171). http://www.robert-schuman.eu/question_europe.php?num=qe-170

BUX Udo. « Was ändert sich im Haushaltsverfahren der EU durch den Vertrag von Lissabon ». *Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung, internationales Privatrecht und Europarecht*, 2009, vol. 50, n. 6, p. 244-249

DELON DESMOULIN Corinne. « La sincérité en droit budgétaire de l'Union européenne : à la recherche de la vérité budgétaire ». *Revue française de finances publiques*, septembre 2010, n. 111, p. 75-83

DÜR Andreas, MATEO GONZÁLEZ Gemma. « Bargaining power and negotiation tactics : the negotiations on the EU's financial perspective, 2007-2013 ». *Journal of common market studies*, 2010, vol. 48, n. 3, p. 557-578. Summary : We argue that in intergovernmental negotiations in the European Union, large Member States, countries with a good alternative to negotiated agreement and governments facing domestic constraints are more likely to resort to a hard bargaining strategy than less powerful Member States. We test this prediction with data from a survey with high-level officials from all EU Member States for the case of the negotiations concerning the EU Financial Perspective 2007–13. The evidence provides support for our argument and casts doubt on studies that suggest either that there are no differences in bargaining strategies across EU member countries or that the main differences exist between old and new EU Member States. --Editor.

HOUSER Matthieu. « La fédéralisation du budget de l'Union européenne : une étape décisive vers l'émergence d'une politique budgétaire communautaire ». *Revue du droit de l'Union européenne*, 2009, n. 4, p. 681-701

KAISER Robert, PRANGE-GSTÖHL Heiko. « Die Überprüfung des EU-Haushalts 2009 : Reformperspektiven für eine zukunftsorientierte Ausgabenstruktur ». *Integration*, 2010, n. 1, p. 36-49

LAFFINEUR Marc. « Rapport d'information sur le projet de budget de l'Union européenne pour l'exercice 2011 (E 5167, E 5168, E 5175 et E 5392) ». Paris : Assemblée nationale, 2010. 51 p. (Les Documents d'information. Délégation pour l'Union européenne. 2701). Texte intégral au format PDF: <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/europe/rap-info/i2701.pdf>

NEHEIDER Susanne. « Die Kompensationsfunktion der EU-Finzen ». Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2010. 172 p. (Europäische Schriften zu Staat und Wirtschaft ; Bd. 29). Contents note: 1. Problemstellung und Aufbau -- 2. Die Entwicklung der EU-Finzen unter besonderer Berücksichtigung politökonomischer Aspekte und der Entscheidungsverfahren -- 3. Theoretische Grundlagen von Stimmentausch und package deals -- 4. Reformvorschläge vor dem Hintergrund der erforderlichen Kompensation -- 5. Vorschlag für eine effizientere Kompensation -- 6. Zusammenfassung -- 7. Literaturverzeichnis.

PIRIS Jean-Claude. « The EU budget ». Host item entry: *The Lisbon Treaty : a legal and political analysis*, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 288-301

POTTEAU Aymeric. « Les finances publiques de l'Union européenne en 2008-2009 ». *Revue trimestrielle de droit européen*, 2010, v. 46, n. 2, avril-juin, p. 347-388

POTTEAU Aymeric. « Les finances publiques de l'Union européenne en 2007 ». *Revue trimestrielle de droit européen*, 2009, v. 45, n. 1, janv.-mars, p. 635-663

RANT Vasja, MRAK Mojmir. « The 2007-13 financial perspective : domination of national interests ». *Journal of common market studies*, 2010, vol. 48, n. 2, p. 347-372. Summary: This article confirms the validity of the hypothesis that national interests were the driving force behind the process and outcome of negotiations for the EU's next financial perspective for 2007-13. The hypothesis is tested by comparing hypothetical coalitions based on quantified national interests (partial net budgetary balances) and the actual (documented) coalitions. Based on these results, the article also discusses implications of the 'net balances problem' for the 2008/09 EU budget review.-- Editor.

THE OWN RESOURCES SYSTEM

ALVES Rui Henrique. « The reform of the EU budget : finding new own resources ». *Intereconomics*, 2009, vol. 44, n. 3, May/June, p. 177-184

BEGG Iain. « Rethinking how to pay for Europe ». Stockholm : Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), 2010. 12 p. (European Policy Analysis / Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) ; 2010:2). <http://www.sieps.se/en/publications/european-policy-analysis/rethinking-how-to-pay-for-europe-20102epa.html>

BORSELLI Fabrizio. « A sensible reform of the EU VAT regime for financial services ». Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009. *International VAT Monitor*, 2009, n. Sept./Oct., p. 375-383.

CATTOIR Philippe. « Options for an EU financing reform ». Paris : Notre Europe, 2009. 69 p. (Policy Paper ; 38). Summary: This paper presents a reflection on the future of the EU budget, with a particular focus on EU financing. The debate on a reform of the EU financing system encompasses two main dimensions: the structure of EU financing and, in particular, whether the Union should be financed via "genuine own resources", ; the correction mechanisms and the way to either eliminate or adapt them. These dimensions are analysed in depth in the paper. This allows presenting three main medium- to long-term scenarios for a financing reform. http://www.notre-europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/PolicyPaper38_PCattoir.pdf

HIERNAUX-FRITSCH Sabine, MOONEN Antonius F.W. « Financiering van de begroting van de Europese Unie ». *Sew Tijdschrift Voor Europees En Economisch Recht*, Zwolle. Jaarg. 58. Nr. 5. Mei 2010. p. 192-197. General note: English translation available: 'Financing the European Union's budget'.

EU BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION

BACHTLER John, MÉNDEZ Carlos, WISHLADE Fiona. « Challenges, consultations and concepts : preparing for the cohesion policy debate ». 65 p. (European Policy Research Paper ; 74).

http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/documents/PDF_files/EPRP_7_4_ChallengesConsultationsandConceptsPreparingfortheCohesionPolicyDebate.pdf

DEVILLÉ Hubert. « Le financement du régime de pensions des fonctionnaires des Communautés européennes ». *Revue française de finances publiques*, avril 2010, n. 110, p. 189-208.

MIRWALDT Katja, MCMASTER Irene, BACHTLER John. « Reconsidering cohesion policy : the contested debate on territorial cohesion ». 52 p. (European Policy Research Paper ; 66).

http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/documents/PDF_files/EPRP_6_6_Reconsidering_Cohesion_Policy.pdf

NÚÑEZ FERRER Jorge. « Internal and external EU climate objectives and the future of the EU budget ». Stockholm : Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), 2010. 8 p. (European Policy Analysis / Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) ; 2010:1).

<http://www.sieps.se/en/publications/european-policy-analysis/-internal-and-external-eu-climate-objectives-and-the-future-of-the-eu-budget-20101epa.html>

SAURER Johannes. « The accountability of supranational administration : the case of European Union agencies ». *American University International Law Review*, 2009, vol. 24, n. 3, p. 429-488. <http://www.auilr.org/pdf/24/24-3-2.pdf>

SZEMLÉR Tamás. « The new EU budget and the new Member States ». Budapest : Hungarian Economic Association (MKT), 2010. 53 p. Contents note: The EU budget – Before a new chapter of an evergreen story – The EU budget after the global financial crisis – EU budget review: the position of Poland's Government and of Polish experts – The EU budget reform – Upcoming debate from the Czech perspective – Hungary and the new EU budget – From damage limitation to red lines: Slovak position to the reform of the EU budget. http://www.mkt.hu/docs/2010-05-04-22-09-09-CENS_MKT_EUBudget_March2010.pdf

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDIT

BALDASSARINI Antonella, BATTELLINI Federica, DI VEROLI Nadia. « Towards a system of supervisory and control for national accounts ». 2010.

<http://homes.stat.unipd.it/mgri/SIS2010/Program/contributedpaper/797-1487-1-DR.pdf>

BARZELAY Michael, LEVY Roger, PORRAS GOMEZ Antonio Martin. « Analyzing public management policy cycles in the European Commission : oversight of budget control and the integrated internal control framework ». London : London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010. 29 p. (LSE / Discussion Paper ; 65).

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper65.pdf>

BLASIAK-NOWAK Beata, RAJCZEWSKA Marzena. « Kontrola zewnętrzna wykonania budżetu Unii Europejskiej i państwa członkowskiego ». *Kontrola Państwowa*, 2010, n. 3 (332), p. 3-28. Initially published in *European Court of Auditors Journal*, December 2009, p. 19-34.

BUSUIOC Madalina. « External audit : the European Court of Auditors and the Joint Audit Committee ». In: *The accountability of European agencies : legal provisions and ongoing practices*, Delft : Eburon, 2010, p. 140-151

NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE (NAO) (United Kingdom). « Financial management in the European Union : Report by the Comptroller and Auditor general ». London : The Stationary Office, 2010. 37 p. (HC 34 Session 2010-2011 : 11 June 2010). http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/1011/financial_management_in_the_eu.aspx

NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE (NAO) (United Kingdom). « Financial management in the European Union : Report by the Comptroller and Auditor general ». London : The Stationary Office, 2009. 45 p. (HC 349 Session 2008-2009 : 27 March 2009).

http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0809/financial_management_in_the_eu.aspx

STERN Elliot. « Evaluation policy in the European Union and its institutions ». *New directions for evaluation*, 2009, n. 123, p. 67-85

SUPREME AUDIT OFFICE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC (Prague). « EU Report 2010 : Report on the EU Financial Management in the CR ». Prague: Supreme Audit Office of the Czech Republic, 2010. 68 p. <http://www.nku.cz/downloads/eu-report/EU-report-2010-EN.pdf>

FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD

BUEB Jean-Pierre. « Des entreprises éthiques pour lutter contre la fraude aux intérêts financiers de l'Union ». *Revue du Marché commun*, 2010, n. 538, p. 323-330. Summary : La fraude aux fonds européens est une industrie d'avenir. C'est toujours une entreprise qui, contrainte ou instigatrice, met en place le procédé frauduleux. Malgré tous les efforts de l'OLAF et des organismes nationaux d'investigation, la recherche de preuves reste difficile. Les risques sont-ils limités lorsque les entreprises adoptent un comportement éthique ? Depuis une dizaine d'années, les entreprises ont adopté des "codes of ethics". Mais, en français, une mise au point lexicographique s'avère indispensable car ce mot anglo-saxon recouvre des notions très différentes. Les codes qui existent sont censés mobiliser les employés et les ouvriers sur la qualité des produits et les cadres sur les valeurs de l'entreprise. Ils doivent également rassurer les

clients et les actionnaires. Ces codes sont donc des outils au service des entreprises. Mais ils permettent également un transfert des responsabilités en cas de fraude ou de corruption. Ils sont souvent associés à un dispositif d'alerte : le whistleblowing. Mais ce dispositif est assez mal accepté car synonyme de délation et il comporte des risques, aussi bien pour celui qui dénonce que pour celui qui peut être victime de dénonciation. Le comportement "éthique" des entreprises est une nécessité mais il ne supprime pas le risque de fraude : il rend seulement un peu plus difficile la découverte du vrai coupable."--Editeur.

CRAIG David, ELLIOTT Matthew. « The great European rip-off : how the corrupt, wasteful EU is taking control of our lives ». London : Random House, 2009. 329 p.

DOIG, Alan. « Asking the right questions? : addressing corruption and EU accession : the case study of Turkey ». *Journal of Financial Crime*, 2010, v. 17, n. 1, p. 9-21. Summary: Turkey is currently a candidate for accession to the European Union (EU), and one of the pre-conditions is to address corruption. Turkey is also a member of the Council of Europe and subject to the GRECO peer-review process on corruption. Various quantitative and qualitative surveys rank Turkey as having a continuing corruption problem, while the 2006 GRECO report warned of a lack of progress and proposed major institutional and other reforms. Turkey's political and administrative development, however, may require the EU to understand that addressing corruption in such a context may require different answers from those normally elicited to the usual questions about what is to be done. --Publisher

HOWSE Tricia. « Concluding reflections : towards a new strategy for anti-fraud cooperation ». *Journal of Financial Crime*, 2010, v. 17, n. 1, p. 163-167. General note: Notes on the EU panel of the British Society of Criminology Conference, 2009. Summary - This paper seeks to examine the prevalence of fraud in the EU, the weaknesses of the current system in combating it, and to suggest recommendations for a more effective effort in this respect.--Publisher

OFFICE EUROPÉEN DE LUTTE ANTI-FRAUDE (OLAF). « Prévenir la fraude en informant le public : table ronde sur la communication anti-fraude ». Edition: 4. éd. Luxembourg : OPOCE, 2010. 471 p. Round table on anti-fraud communication: "Deterring fraud by informing the public". http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/olaf-oafc/r/c/i_fr.html

QUIRKE Brendan. « Economic crime and legal competence in the EU », 2009. 20 p. http://www.ljmu.ac.uk/AFE/AFE_docs/cibef0109b.pdf

QUIRKE Brendan. « EU Fraud : institutional and legal competence ». *Crime, law and social change*, 2009, v. 51, n. 5, p. 531-547

TUPMAN William. « Keeping under the radar : watch out for "Smurfs" ». *Journal of Financial Crime*, 2010, v. 17, n. 1, p. 151-162. Summary - The purpose of this paper is to argue that small-scale, low-value but high-volume fraud should be pursued as seriously as high-value, organised crime-related fraud.— Publisher

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