# Assessing the effectivity of public policy instruments

via an algorithmic language

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#### Structure of the presentation

- Research context and goals
- 2 Development of an algorithmic language
- 3 Effectivity of an instrument



#### Research context and goals



Assessing the effectivity of public policy instruments

#### Research context

- Insee economist in the French Ministry of Environment
- Regulation is based on standard instruments (tax, ban, market, etc.) & innovative ones (contract, quota, nudge, certificates, etc.)
  - Increasing number of involved actors
  - Coexistence of multiple and diverse means of influence (command-and-control, soft law, etc.)






#### Research context

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- Regulation is based on standard instruments (tax, ban, market, etc.) & innovative ones (contract, quota, nudge, certificates, etc.)
  - Increasing number of involved actors
  - Coexistence of multiple and diverse means of influence (command-and-control, soft law, etc.)
- Is Regulatory Impact Analysis able to face and assimilate the increasing diversity and complexity of instruments?
  - Rationalization of public action
  - Transparency of public decisions
  - · Clarity of the law
- ► Example : the Energy Savings Certificates Scheme is allegedly an innovative instrument : new (hybrid) but not effective (implementation biases)!


# Going from...



 Example : We'd like to reduce pollution → we implement a tax → if not sufficient, we modulate its level



#### ... to



 Now, we first characterize an instrument & assess its effectivity... can I explain my new method in 15/20 minutes?



Elements of the languag The design rules An example : "the tax"

#### Development of an algorithmic language



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- So far... an instrument is defined as a generic mean of influencing people through collective action :
  - Ban, market, roads, control of wages, agricultural land reforms, etc.
  - It's too vague a definition!





# Development of an algorithmic language

- So far... an instrument is defined as a generic mean of influencing people through collective action :
  - Ban, market, roads, control of wages, agricultural land reforms, etc.
  - It's too vague a definition!
- So far... instruments are mainly characterized via dimensional classifications (typologies)

Resources	Financial	Non-financial
Constraint		
High		Obligation
Intermediate	Taxes	(Taxes ?)
Low	Market, Subsidies (Taxes ?)	Sensitization

Ambivalence  $\rightarrow$  What is the true and specific essence of a tax? of any instrument?

# Development of an algorithmic language

- A new definition : an instrument is the intended causal chain of a collective action
  - If the firm pollutes, then it pays a sum that is proportional, and that discourages it from polluting (again)





# The language elements

- A comprehensive, minimalistic & user-friendly language :
  - 5 impact vectors: making something certain / impossible / more likely / less likely / possible
  - 3 variables : actors, actions, events
  - 5 logical operators : if/else (or else), as long as/do, do/until, and/or, not
- ► An instrument is a unique & specific combination of these elements
- ▶ We have developed an equivalent graphic language






#### The design rules

- All causal chains should be :
  - complete (example : actor-action)
  - consistant (example : two Boolean impact vectors can not coexist at the same spot)
  - connected (i.e. all elements are related in one way or another)
- ► It's our conceptual & generative language (Pahl & Beitz 1977)
- ► An instrument = a C³ causal chain, as expressed in this algorithmic language





• The tax can be represented as :




- Examples of concretization :
  - ▶ If the firm pollutes, then it pays a sum that is proportional, and that discourages it from polluting (again)






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- ► Examples of concretization :
  - ▶ If the firm pollutes, then it pays a sum that is proportional, and that discourages it from polluting (again)
  - ► If the firm pollutes, then it announces it publicly, and that discourages it from polluting (again)



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


- ► Examples of concretization :
  - ▶ If the firm pollutes, then it pays a sum that is proportional, and that discourages it from polluting (again)
  - ▶ If the firm pollutes, then it announces it publicly, and that discourages it from polluting (again)
  - If my flatmate uses my microwave, then he cleans all the kitchen, and that discourages him from using my microwave (again)






 The tax can also be represented as (see instrumental extension & fractalization):



- Examples of concretization :
  - ▶ If the firm pollutes, then the fiscal administration sends a tax notice to compel the firm to pay a sum that is proportional to its pollution, in order to discourages it from polluting and to make it possible to subsidize public research in clean energies



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- Examples of concretization :
  - If the firm pollutes, then the fiscal administration sends a tax notice to compel the firm to pay a sum that is proportional to its pollution, in order to discourages it from polluting and to make it possible to subsidize public research in clean energies
  - If my flatmate uses my microwave, then I speak to him to have him clean all the kitchen, in order to discourage him from using my microwave and in order to allow me to spare some time

 There is no one "tax" but an infinite number of taxes → a heuristic reverse designing (cf. halo-instruments)



• An instrument is *effective* if it undoubtedly performs in the social reality



- As an instrument = a C<sup>3</sup> causal chain, we know all its fundamental features
- An instrument is effective if and only if we observe the effectiveness of all its elements in the social reality:
  - The starting "actor-action" modules
  - The vectors impact between all the "actor-action"
  - The logical operators





- Development of an extended "difference-in-difference evaluation" method
- Example 1: "X makes Y more likely" is effective if:
  - Y is at the end more likely to be realized than is used to be at the beginning (i.e.

$$P(Y = 1|X = 1, T = 1) \ge P(Y = 1|X = 1, T = 0) + \alpha_1)$$

• The fact that Y becomes more likely is not only due to X-independent factor (i.e.

$$[P(Y = 1|X = 1, T = 1) - P(Y = 1|X = 1, T = 0)] - [P(Y = 1|X = 0, T = 1)] - P(Y = 1|X = 0, T = 0)] \ge \alpha_2)$$



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- A subsidy to promote hybrid cars is given in region A, and not in region B (the conterfactual). One year later, the proportion of hybrid cars among the sold cars...
  - ... went from 5% to 10% in region A
  - ... went from 5.5% to 12% in region B
  - ullet The impact vector is not effective!



- Example 2: "X makes Y impossible" is effective if:
  - Y is at the end very unlikely to be realized (i.e.  $P(Y = 1|X = 1, T = 1) < \alpha_1)$
  - The fact that Y was quite possible at the beginning (i.e.  $P(Y=1|X=1,T=0) \ge \alpha_2$  and  $P(Y=1|X=0,T=0) \ge \alpha_3$  where  $\alpha_2, \alpha_3 \ge \alpha_1$ )
  - The fact that Y becomes very unlikely is not only due to X-independent factor (i.e.  $P(Y=1|X=0,T=1) \geq \alpha_4$  where  $\alpha_4 \geq \alpha_1$ )



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 where  $\alpha_2$ ,  $\alpha_3 \ge \alpha_1$ 

- The fact that Y becomes very unlikely is not only due to X-independent factor (i.e.  $P(Y=1|X=0,T=1) \ge \alpha_4$  where  $\alpha_4 \ge \alpha_1$ )
- A wall is built around a garden to prevent people from going through. One month later, the number of people going through each day...
  - ... went from 5 to 1
  - ... would have been stable without the wall
  - ullet The impact vector is effective (or maybe not)



- A way of identifying really effective instruments (ex-post evaluation)... but also a way of assessing the potential effectivity of an instrument before its implementation (ex-ante evaluation)
  - Questioning the power of will (non-neutrality of instruments)
  - Enlighting the (micro, meso, macro) intricacies and entanglements of instruments





#### **Applications**

- Now, a few months of intervention research :
  - With simple examples (forbidding plastic bags, encouraging students, etc.)
  - Around the the Energy Savings Scheme to make it effective





#### A simple example

GOAL: Ban on distributing plastic bags (i.e. having the using rate going from 60% to 0%)

POLICY: If a business distributes plastic bags, so he must pay a  $10k \in$ fine, which prevents it from distributing plastic bags (again) (prohibitive tax)

IMPACT: 25% of businesses keep on distributing plastic bags

► GOAL vs. IMPACT : a 25-point difference



#### A simple example

GOAL : Ban on distributing plastic bags (i.e. having the using rate going from 60% to 0%)

GENERIC INSTRUMENT : If an actor A takes actions Ac, so he takes action Ac', which prevents it from taking action Ac (again)


CONCRETE INSTRUMENT (=POLICY): If a business distributes plastic bags, so he must pay a  $10k \in$  fine, which prevents it from distributing plastic bags (again) (prohibitive tax)

IMPLEMENTATION : 30% of businesses distributing pastic bags don't pay the fine, and 10% of those paying it weren't discouraged afterwards

IMPACT: 25% of businesses keep on distributing plastic bags

lacktriangle A 25-point difference... and two biaises (ightarrow non-effectivity)

# The Energy Saving Certificates Scheme








# Conclusion & future prospects

- This approach, around a common language & method, allows:
  - The identification of the set of (innovative) instruments
  - The comparison of heuristics of (reverse)-designing
  - The evaluation of effectivity (alongside efficacy, efficiency, etc.)
  - The design of innovative instruments





#### Questions, suggestions and remarks

#### Thank you for your attention!

 Article online: "Développement d'une approche algorithmique pour caractériser la nature protéiforme et fractale des instruments" (Developing an algorithmic approach to caracterize the fractal & protean nature of instruments)



